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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
the individual has a remedy without subjecting the official to the inhibitory
fear of personal responsibility. Certainly it is only right that the government
bear the ultimate burden of injuries which result from the pursuit of a public
interest. Restraint of irresponsible official conduct can then be achieved by
administrative discipline. While the Federal Tort Claims Act has moved in
this direction by including a broad waiver of sovereign immunity in tort,3 6
it still expressly excepts certain "intentional" torts, including defamation.3 7
The state legislatures, reluctant to waive sovereign immunity have done
virtually nothing to improve the situation.3 8 So long as government refuses
to face up to its responsibility, the courts must continue to resolve the prob-
lem, and the result may not be very promising to the one innocently defamed.
Michael Friedlander
36 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958).
3728 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1958).




Plaintiff slipped and fell upon the floor of a school building. Within a few
days her son contacted a member of the school board and advised him that
a claim for injuries would be brought before the board of education. Shortly
thereafter an investigating agent of the defendant school district contacted
plaintiff and obtained the information required by the notice provisions of
Illinois Revised Statutes chapter 122, section 823. Relying upon statements
by this agent that he would again contact the plaintiff relative to the claim,
the plaintiff failed to secure counsel or give timely notice. Subsequently, a
complaint by the plaintiff alleging negligence on the part of the school district
in the composition and care of the floor was dismissed upon motion by the
defendant in accord with Illinois Revised Statutes chapter 122, section 824,
which gives the school district a right to bar an action if the plaintiff fails
to file written notice within six months of the time of injury. Plaintiff suc-
cessfully appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the notice provisions,
which were alleged to be in violation of article IV, section 22 of the Illinois
State Constitution prohibiting special legislation. Lorton v. Brown County
Community Unit School Dist. No. 1, 35 Ill. 2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161 (1966).
The present case is one of several decisions handed down by the Illinois
Supreme Court in their attempt to up-date the out-moded rules concerning
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governmental tort liability. Although many writers had expressed a belief
that modernization was needed in this area,' the General Assembly remained
inactive. Reform came through judicial action with the initial rejection of
governmental immunity in Molitor v. Kaneland School Dist. No. 302.2 From
the time of that decision, the court recognized that numerous statutes relating
to municipal tort liability had brought about an inconsistent pattern of re-
covery against governmental agencies. By declaring one of these statutes
unconstitutional, the decision in Lorton represents a further whittling away
at the legislative inconsistencies which have brought about inequalities of
recovery against municipal corporations and is a step toward achieving
uniformity of remedy for claimants against governmental agencies. This has
been effected through a somewhat tenuous application of the mandate against
special legislation,3 which traditionally has been held inapplicable to municipal
corporations. 4 The Lorton decision, however, extends the rationale of a
prior application of this mandate in a case involving a park district,5 to en-
compass not only school districts, but any municipal corporation which
capriciously bars a claimant's right to recover. This case note will therefore
survey the reasoning of the decisions leading up to the present case and
attempt to discover what its decision presages for the future.
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a school district, as an agency
of the government, was immune from liability for tortiously inflicted personal
injury arising out of the operation of a school.6 Traditionally this rule had
rested on two principles, the first of which is to the effect that official agencies
operate for the benefit of the public as a whole, and the achievement of
public goals should not be hampered by an over-emphasized concern for
individual claims. This has been couched in the phrase, "The King can do no
wrong."'7 The second principle states that public funds should not risk possible
1 See Borchard, Governmental Liability In Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Harno, Tort
Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4 ILL. L. Q. 28 (1921) ; Pugh, Historical Approach
to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476 (1953); Repko, American
Legal Commentary On the Doctrine of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CONTMP.
PROB. 214 (1942); Rosenfield, Governmental Immunity From Liability For Tort In
School Accidents, 5 LEGAL NOTES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 358 (1940); Comment, Tort
Claims Against the State of Illinois and its Subdivisions, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 914 (1953).
2 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
3 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 22 (1870): "The General Assembly shall not pass local or
special laws .. .granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or
exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever."
4 Curry v. Decatur Park Dist., 27 Ill. 2d 434, 189 N.E.2d 338 (1963); Cf. Coutrakon
v. Lohr, 9 Ill. 2d 539, 138 N.E.2d 471 (1956).
5 Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1965).
6 Kinnare v..City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898).
7 See generally, 38 Am. JUR., Municpal Corporations, § 573 (1941); Ehrlich,
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depletion in the satisfaction of individual judgments.8 This second principle
was eliminated in 1952 by Thomas v. Broadlands Comm. Consol. School
Dist. No. 201, 9 which established that a cause of action would lie against a
school district if it held liability insurance; however, the immunity doctrine
continued on the aforementioned rationale of governmental infallability.
In 1870 governmental immunity was adopted in Illinois,10 and in 1898
the doctrine was extended to school districts." This was eight years after the
English courts, which originated the doctrine,12 refused a similar applica-
tion. 13 For over fifty years, Illinois adhered to governmental immunity with-
out reconsideration or re-evaluation. Then in the Molitor case,'14 the Illinois
Supreme Court made an extensive reappraisal. The court viewed govern-
mental infallability as an anachronism from medieval times,15 and held, as
fundamental to the whole modern law of torts, that liability follows negligence
and that individuals and corporations should be responsible for the negligence
of their agents and employees acting in the course of their employment.' 6
With the rejection of governmental infallability, the final principle under-
lying governmental immunity had been taken away, and the doctrine collapsed.
After the rejection of school district immunity, the Illinois courts and
General Assembly were forced to recognize that the reasoning which prompted
the rejection of the school districts' claim of immunity also applied to
other municipal corporations. With this, began an examination of the degree
to which the various state agencies accepted tort liability. It was found that
where the state had been protected under constitutionally created 17 and
judicially supported sovereign immunity, but had made provisions for redress
of claims sounding in tort,18 the municipal and quasi-municipal corporations
had established the opposite position. These various agencies attempted to
Proceedings Against the Crown, VI CAM AND EHRLICH OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND
LEGAL HISTORY (1921).
8 Thomas v. Broadlands Comm. Consol. School Dist. No. 201, 348 Ill. App. 567,
109 N.E.2d 636 (1952).
9 Id. at 575, 109 N.E.2d at 640.
1o Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346 (1870).
11 Kinnare v. City of Chicago, supra note 6.
12 Russel v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 671, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
13 See Molitor v. Kaneland School Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 15-16, 163 N.E.2d 89,
91 (1959).
14 Molitor v. Kaneland School Dist. No. 302, 18 11. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
151d. at 21, 163 N.E.2d at 94; see also, 38 Am. JrR., Municipal Corporations, § 573;
Borchard, Government Liability In Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 6.
16 Molitor v. Kaneland School Dist. No. 302, supra note 14, at 20, 163 N.E.2d at 93.
1 7 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 26 (1870).
18 Supra note 5, at 64, 203 N.E.2d at 575.
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deny liability by individually seeking legislative immunity. The result was
a highly erratic pattern of recovery against these corporate agencies: forest
preserves and park districts were not liable for negligence; municipalities
although without provisions for general immunity were liable only in certain
instances; private schools and school districts had a ten thousand dollar
ceiling on liability; counties were not liable for negligence, but were required
to make provisions for indemnifying sheriffs and losses due to non-willful
torts; township and district highway commissioners were fully liable for
neglect of duty; and, drainage districts were liable for negligent torts, but
the district commissioners were absolved of personal liability.' 9
In addition, the courts have classified local units of government as "quasi-
municipal" and "municipal" corporations. The activities of the latter class
have been categorized as "governmental" and "proprietary," with full lia-
bility in tort imposed if the function is classified as "proprietary. '20 The
incongruities that have resulted from attempts to fit particular conduct into
one or the other of these categories have been the subject of frequent com-
ment.
Thus, one injured by a park district truck was barred from recovery
while one injured by a city or village truck was allowed remedy, and one
injured by a school district truck was allowed to recover only within a
prescribed limit.
In 1964, this uneven distribution of the right to recover against govern-
mental agencies came under attack in Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist.,21 which
sought to declare legislation granting immunity to park districts an uncon-
stitutional violation of both the prohibition against special legislation in
section 22 of article IV of the Illinois State Constitution, and section 19 of
article II of that Constitution, which provides that "every person ought to
find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may
receive in his person, property or reputation."
The basis of the decision was the court's construction of article IV, sec-
tion 22. The proscription against special legislation in this section was created
to prevent arbitrary discrimination through enactments of the General
Assembly.2 2 It is not discrimination that is to be avoided, but its capricious-
ness.2 3 Accordingly, legislation affecting distinct classes is permitted if the
classification is reasonable and uniform24 or pertains to a substantial dif-
19 Supra note 5, at 63, 203 N.E.2d at 574.
20 Molitor v. Kaneland School Dist. No. 302, supra note 14, at 17, 163 N.E.2d at 92.
21 Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., supra note 5, at 64-65, 203 N.E.2d 574.
22 Rudolph Express Co. v. Bibb, 15 Ill. 2d 76, 153 N.E.2d 820 (1958).
23 Springfield Gas and Electric Co. v. City of Springfield, 257 U.S. 66 (1921);
Cf. Moshier v. City of Springfield, 370 Ill. 541, 19 N.E.2d 598 (1939).
24 Seeman v. Greer College, 302 Ill. 538, 135 N.E. 80 (1922).
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ference which bears a proper relation to the classification.25 When an enact-
ment places a burden on some, but not all the people, or when there is no
logical or discernible reason apparent for variation, 26 then the statute amounts
to unconstitutional special legislation.
In light of this prohibition against arbitrary discrimination, the plaintiff
in the Harvey decision successfully argued that the statute which purported
to bar recovery against a park district violated the prohibition against spe-
cial legislation, since recovery would have been granted had the same injury
occurred in a school or forest preserve district. Such a pattern indicated that
the sole basis for the differentiation was a fortuitous circumstance-whether
the third-party tortfeasor happened to be under statutory provision for im-
munity. This is the type of arbitrary discrimination which would properly
invoke the proscription against special legislation.
There is, however, a further consideration which limits the application
of article IV, section 22. The prohibition concerning special legislation
traditionally has not been applied against legislation solely affecting muni-
cipal corporations.27 The precedent for this has been adhered to since 1911
when the court stated that, with respect to corporations created for the
purpose of administering the affairs of state agencies through limited, dele-
gated powers, with public funds derived from taxation, and officers elected
for comparatively short terms, it would be unreasonable to assume that its
affairs could be conducted by the same rules which govern the business of
a private corporation with its own funds under continuous management.28
Therefore, it would be essential to public interest that rules should be estab-
lished governing the transactions of such bodies different from those which
apply to the affairs of individuals and corporations.
In view of the exception made for legislation affecting solely municipal
corporations, the interdiction against special legislation would have been
inapplicable had the right to have civil action dismissed and future action
barred been viewed only as an immunity conferred upon the school dis-
trict.29 Instead, the court has held the requirements of the provisions for
notice to be merely a limitation on liability.30 The sections of the act con-
taining this limitation of school districts' tort liability, which the Lorton
25Moore v. County Board of School Trustees of Logan County, 10 Ill. 2d 320, 139
N.E.2d 738 (1957) ; Moshier v. City of Springfield, supra note 23; Sellers v. Brady, 262
Ill. 578, 105 N.E. 1 (1914).
26Punke v. Village of Elliott, 364 Ill. 604, 5 N.E.2d 389 (1936).
27 Curry v. Decatur Park Dist., supra note 4.
28 Condon v. City of Chicago, 249 Ill. 596, 94 N.E. 976 (1911).
29 Cf. Curry v. Decatur Park Dist., supra note 4.
3o Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 33 Ill. 2d 425, 211 N.E.2d 690 (1965).
[Vol. XVII
decision has declared unconstitutional, included the requirement that a
claimant file written notice of the claim in the office of the school board
clerk or secretary. The inclusion of the required conduct on the part of the
claimant class enlarged the scope of those affected by the legislation to
include more than solely the school district. Since the legislation affected
more than solely the quasi-municipal corporation, the traditionally re-
stricted application of the prohibition against special legislation was avoided.
Then, by viewing the provisions for notice as a burden placed on the claim-
ants against school districts which is not uniformly borne by those bringing
actions against other state agencies, the limitation was declared unconsti-
tutional.
Beyond extending the application of the special legislation sanctions to
school districts, the Lorton decision, in line with -the Molitor holding, sets
further restrictions upon other governmental agencies attempting to deny
liability for negligence. In its decision the court specified that any statute
which applied a procedural right to some, but not others, under substan-
tially like circumstances, should be held unconstitutional. 31 The like circum-
stances which the court was looking at was not the pattern of recovery
solely among claimants against the school district, but the distinction be-
tween cases brought against school districts as opposed to those against
other quasi-municipal corporations. 32 It cannot be denied that there was
discrimination between litigants who satisfied the school district provisions
and those who did not; however, reasons have been given why notice pro-
visions such as these are necessary, 33 and previous decisions applying article
IV, section 22 have pointed out that such discrimination is permissible when
in line with the purpose of the legislation.3 4 There was, however, no dis-
cernible reason for variation in recovery between a case barred for failure
to file notice in an action against a school district and recovery against
another district where such provisions are not required. If the perspective
was a consideration of acceptance of liability in a school district as opposed
to other governmental corporations, then this is indication that the provisions
were objectionable because they in effect conferred upon the school district
a means of denying liability when other districts would be held accountable.Therefore, although it was necessary to phrase the challenge to con-
stitutionality in terms of the burden imposed upon claimants in order to
sufficiently widen the scope of those affected by the legislation to permit
31 Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit School Dist. No. 1, 35 Ill. 2d 362, 366,
220 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1967).
32 Id.
33 David, Tort Liability of Local Government: Alternatives to Immunity from Liability
or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 32 (1959).
34 Moshier v. City of Springfield, supra note 23.
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application of article IV, section 22, there is further indication consistent
with the notion that the provisions appear objectionable because of the
privilege they conferred to the school district and not because of their func-
tion per se. The court pointed out that the substantially identical provisions
in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act3 5 would not be repugnant to the constitutional proscriptions. The pro-
visions of the suggested legislation are distinguished from the stricken statutes
in that the former are uniformly applied to all the municipal and quasi-
municipal corporations.
The Lorton decision will not be the last in line to rule upon the propriety
of procedural considerations affecting liability of quasi-municipal corpora-
tions. Collectively, the recent decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court have
established a trend toward placing upon governmental agencies, with certain
modifications, the same responsibility individuals or business entities have
with respect to tort liability. When future comment appears on the remain-
ing statutes, which were enacted to meet the additional responsibilities
placed on governmental agencies after the rejection of governmental im-
munity, it should be borne in mind that the reasons for the traditionally re-
stricted application of the proscription against special legislation also serve
to point out that governmental corporations, which cannot always be rea-
sonably expected to operate by the same rules that govern private corpora-
tions, have a greater need for notice of claims. The School District Tort
Liability Act recognized this. The Lorton decision, however, has rejected the
school districts' notice provisions and created a void in procedural needs.
To fill this void it appears likely that more emphasis will be placed on the
future enforcement of the uniform provisions of the Local Governmental
and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act not only in the school
districts but in all municipal and quasi-municipal corporations.
Thomas Puklin
35 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 8-101 to -103 (1965).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-SECURED TRANSACTIONS-
JUDGMENT CREDITOR NOT A "BUYER"
AT EXECUTION SALE
Shawmut National Bank was the assignee of a purchase money security
interest in consumer goods perfected automatically under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC).' Neither the secured party nor the assignee, Shawmut,
had filed a financing statement. Charles Vera, an attaching judgment creditor
1The Uniform Commercial Code, section 9-302(1) provides that purchase money
security interests in consumer goods are perfected automatically but filing is required
for fixtures and motor vehicles required to be licensed.
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